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Cooperation between 
SSTC NRS and the EU 
in the area of nuclear safety
The paper first briefly outlines the main characteristics of the EU as-
sistance programs aimed to enhance nuclear safety in the Beneficiary 
countries. Then EU assistance provided to the Ukrainian regulator (SNRIU) 
is detailed, with specific emphasis on projects enhancing the capabilities 
of SSTC NRS as technical support organisation (TSO) to SNRIU, includ-
ing training and tutoring (T&T) activities. The changing role of SSTC NRS 
in the cooperation activities is described as well. The broad range of co-
operation is then illustrated by some selected projects focusing on various 
technical areas (e.g. severe accident management and mitigation, radioac-
tive waste and spent fuel management, NPP service time extension, plant 
performance monitoring and operating experience feedback).
Finally, the paper briefly discusses the future perspectives of the nucle-
ar safety cooperation between the EU and Ukraine.
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Співпраця між ДНТЦ ЯРБ і ЄС у сфері ядерної безпеки
На початку статті коротко викладені основні характеристики 
програм підтримки ЄС, спрямованих на підвищення ядерної безпе-
ки в країнах-бенефіціарах. Далі детально описується підтримка ЄС, 
що надається українському регулюючому органу (ДІЯРУ) з акцентом 
на проекти, спрямовані на розширення можливостей ДНТЦ ЯРБ як ор-
ганізації технічної підтримки (ОТП) ДІЯРУ, охоплюючи навчання і на-
ставництво. Описується зміна ролі ДНТЦ ЯРБ у заходах зі співробіт-
ництва, широкий спектр співпраці в рамках деяких вибраних проектів 
з акцентом на різні технічні області (наприклад, управління важкими 
аваріями і пом’якшення наслідків, поводження з радіоактивними від-
ходами та відпрацьованим паливом, продовження терміну експлуа-
тації АЕС, контроль робочих характеристик станції та обмін досвідом 
експлуатації).
Стисло обговорюються майбутні перспективи співпраці ЄС 
та України у сфері ядерної безпеки.
Ключові слова: ядерна безпека, програма надання підтримки, ор-
ган ядерного регулювання.
©  H. Pauwels, P. Daures, Y.J. Stockmann, J. Végh, 2017
T
he Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 
(INSC) is aimed at “financing measures to support 
the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety, 
radiation protection and the application of efficient 
and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third 
countries”. One of its specific objectives is to provide “continuous 
support for regulatory bodies, technical support organisations, 
and the reinforcement of the regulatory framework, notably 
concerning licensing activities”. INSC supports nuclear safety, 
not nuclear energy.
With respect to the reinforcement of nuclear safety infra‑
structure, INSC pays special attention to the establishment and 
further development competent, capable and independent na‑
tional nuclear regulators, as well as their TSO network. The EC 
believes — in accordance with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) — that a strong and independent national nu‑
clear regulator has a key role in establishing and maintaining 
a high level of nuclear safety in any country. Inside the EU, this 
is ensured by the nuclear safety directive [1].
Before the adoption of the INSC, the TACIS (Technical 
Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) pro‑
gramme was launched by the European Commission (EC) 
in 1991 to help members of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) and Mongolia during their transition to demo‑
cratic market‑oriented economies. The Nuclear Safety com‑
ponent of TACIS provided assistance to improve the safety 
of civil nuclear facilities in the CIS countries. TACIS is now 
partly included in the EuropeAid programme [2], while from 
2007 on, the nuclear safety assistance is provided in the frame 
of INSC [3], in this article also INSC‑I. INSC provides a glob‑
al coverage outside the European Union (EU). In 2014 INSC‑I 
was replaced by a new, INSC‑II instrument with the same 
name [4].
While TACIS was orientated to help the former Soviet states 
and Mongolia, the INSC has no geographical limits outside 
the EU: it is a global instrument assisting any country eligible 
for support. Note that INSC‑II also includes nuclear safety co‑
operation with EU candidate countries (e.g. Serbia), previously 
covered by the PHARE and later the IPA (Instrument for Pre‑
accession Assistance) instrument.
Fig. 1 shows the geographical distribution of the different 
support types in INSC‑I, illustrating the “global” operation 
of the instrument.
INSC activities are implemented by the EC Directorate 
General International Co‑operation & Development 
(DG DEVCO) by applying centralised management, in which 
all projects are managed directly by EC project managers re‑
siding in Brussels. Detailed program planning is performed by 
means of Annual Action Programmes (AAPs) containing ac‑
tions jointly proposed by the partner countries and the European 
Commission and approved by the EU member states.
Most actions are implemented with projects, which are im‑
plemented by contractors, following the EU financial rules. 
The tendering and contracting procedure follows the regula‑
tions laid down in the implementation rules for EC external 
instruments [5]. Experts from the Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
provide technical and scientific support to DG DEVCO during 
the definition and implementation phases of the INSC projects.
Table 1 shows some characteristic numbers describing 
the completed and ongoing nuclear safety assistance projects. 
Note that until 2014 Ukraine had a highly privileged sta‑
tus in the INSC: between 1991 and 2013, 50 % of the INSC 
budget was spent in Ukraine. INSC‑II was launched in 2014 
and it had significantly lower budget than the previous instru‑
ment. The share of assistance provided to Ukraine decreased 
to 10 %, as well. INSC‑II also introduced a significant change 
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in the thematic areas of assistance: the new instrument fo‑
cused on nuclear safety culture (50 % of the budget); manage‑
ment of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste (35 %) and 
nuclear safeguards (10 %). The remaining 5 % of the budget 
was allocated to various support measures (see [6] for more 
details). The on‑site assistance to nuclear power plant opera‑
tors — an area dominant in TACIS and continued in the pre‑
vious INSC‑I instrument — was practically eliminated from 
INSC‑II, for mainly two reasons, firstly the involved nuclear 
operators were judged mature enough to manage their safety 
enhancement and plant modernisation projects themselves and 
secondly, not safety related, Ukraine was going to enter the EU 
energy market and such support activities could be perceived 
as distorting market competition.
Table 1. TACIS and INSC budgets [6, 7]
EC Instrument Status
Total 
[m EUR]
Ukraine 
[m EUR]
%
TACIS, 1991—2006 Completed 1260 626 50
INSC‑I, 2007—2013 Completed 524 261 50
INSC‑II, 2014—2020 Ongoing 225 21(1) + 30(2) 10
(1) Committed amount as of 31.12.2016
(2) Contribution to Chernobyl Shelter Fund in addition to INSC‑II budget
Regulatory assistance projects are under implementa‑
tion or have been approved for e.g. Armenia, Belarus, China, 
Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, 
Ukraine and Vietnam. Projects supporting radioactive waste 
(RAW) management are carried out in Armenia, Iraq and 
Ukraine. A special area of RAW management is the remedi‑
ation of contaminated and legacy sites: related INSC projects 
were launched in Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan (Fig. 2), 
Ukraine (Prydniprovskiy Chemical Plant) and Uzbekistan. So 
far, INSC safeguards projects were mainly focusing on Africa 
and China. The multi‑country Training and Tutoring (T&T) 
project is a successful initiative attracting a large number 
of trainees worldwide. In this project, T&T is provided for 
the experts of the nuclear regulators and their TSOs, as well 
as for specialists of radiation protection, safeguards and RAW 
management facilities. SSTC NRS is part of one of the consor‑
tia which take care of the training activities [8].
For more details on the EU nuclear regulatory assistance 
see [9].
The Ukrainian Nuclear Sector and the INSC Support
Nuclear Power Plants. Ukraine currently has 15 nuclear power 
plant (NPP) units in operation at four sites. These plants are 
operated by the National Nuclear Energy Generating Company 
(NNEGC) “Energoatom” which is responsible to the Ministry 
of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine. The total installed 
net capacity of the plants is 13.1 GWe. Nuclear represents 
approximately 25 % of the installed electricity generating 
capacity of Ukraine, but usually it provides more than 40 % 
of the electricity generated. In addition, the latest energy 
Fig. 1. Thematic areas 
of support  
in the INSC‑I instrument 
(2007—2013) [3]
Fig. 2. The “Yellow Hill” containing uranium ore 
waste at the Taboshar legacy site in Tajikistan, its 
remediation is supported by the INSC [3]
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strategy of Ukraine proposes at least 5.0 GWe of new nuclear 
electricity generating capacity by 2030.
All Ukrainian VVER units belong to the 2nd generation 
reactors and they went into operation after 1981. In the last 
decade the service time extension of the units is going on, e.g. 
the two VVER‑440/V213 units at Rivne have been granted 
20 years license extensions in 2010. The two VVER‑1000/302 
and /338 type units of the South Ukrainian NPP underwent 
major upgrades and their operating license extension until 2025 
was approved at the end of 2015. In 2015 Energoatom requested 
15 years licence extension for the first two VVER‑1000/320 type 
units of the Zaporizhzhia NPP (Fig. 3). Further service time 
extensions are expected in the future; based on the experience 
with the accomplished lifetime extension (LTE) programs.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ukraine 
faced two major nuclear safety related problems: the design‑ 
and operational safety of its power reactors and the legacy 
of the Chernobyl accident. Note that in the early nineties three 
RBMK units were still in operation at Chernobyl NPP and 
the last RBMK was shut‑down permanently in 2000.
In 2010 a joint study of the European Commission, the IAEA 
and Ukraine was prepared to assess the safety level of all operat‑
ing Ukrainian NPPs. The study showed that the Ukrainian NPP 
units generally complied with most of the requirements outlined 
in the IAEA nuclear safety standards, if the effect of planned 
safety upgrade measures were duly taken into account in the safe‑
ty assessments. Note that the planned safety upgrade measures 
were outlined in the Complex (Consolidated) Safety Upgrading 
Programme (CCSUP) containing a series of safety enhancement 
measures for all Ukrainian NPPs. In 2015 Energoatom received 
loans from EURATOM and the EBRD (each loan equalled 
€300 million), as a substantial help to finance the implementa‑
tion costs (totalling to €1.4 billion) of the CCSUP.
After the Fukushima accident in 2011, Ukraine participat‑
ed in the EU stress tests exercise together with the EU mem‑
ber states and Switzerland [10]. The stress test assessments 
of Ukrainian NPPs were completed and a number of safety 
improvement measures to increase the robustness of plant re‑
sponses were identified. Those measures that were not already 
included in the CCSUP would be implemented in the frame 
of the Ukrainian National Action Plan.
A large number of modernisation and safety enhancement 
projects were implemented at the Ukrainian NPPs in the past 
decades. As from the financial support side, TACIS and INSC 
programmes were the major contributors to these projects. TACIS 
supported a large safety upgrade programme of Ukrainian NPPs 
through the on‑site assistance (OSA) programmes and through 
the supply of safety‑related equipment. The INSC‑I programme 
contained mainly “soft” assistance targeted at the Ukrainian 
NPPs, providing transfer of EU know‑how and best practice 
related to NPP operational safety and safety culture.
In the INSC‑II instrument the role of direct support 
to the NPP operators has decreased to a minimum and the on‑
site assistance is to be gradually phased out. The last OSA pro‑
jects for Ukraine were programmed in the 2012 AAP. However, 
all actions that were already programmed and approved will be 
implemented with the agreed content.
Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste. Ukraine 
has to deal with a complex situation, if management of radioactive 
waste and spent nuclear fuel is considered. In addition to its 
15 operating NPP units, the country has 2 research reactors 
and 6 interregional specialised enterprises built in the 1960s for 
disposal of institutional radioactive waste (“Radon” facilities). 
These disposal facilities are currently considered as temporary 
storage facilities. At the Chernobyl NPP site, there are 
three RBMK reactors in shutdown and the damaged Unit 4, 
surrounded by an Exclusion Zone of 30 km radius, where more 
than 800 temporary radioactive waste facilities are located. 
A new disposal site (Vektor) was recently licensed to accept 
Chernobyl NPP decommissioning waste. The Buryakovka 
disposal site, which was built shortly after the 1986 accident, is 
currently under assessment and considered for extension.
The spent nuclear fuel is mainly stored in wet storage facilities 
at the NPP sites, with the exception of Zaporizhzhia NPP, where 
a dry storage facility was constructed. A new dry storage facility 
(ISF‑2) is currently under construction for the Chernobyl NPP. 
Radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel inventory will increase 
in the future due to the operation of the current NPPs, site 
remediation activities, use of radioisotopes, development of new 
nuclear facilities and from the return of vitrified waste from 
the spent fuel reprocessing in Russia.
Since 2009, a comprehensive national strategy for managing 
Ukraine’s legacy waste and future radioactive waste is in place 
addressing all stages of radioactive waste management and all 
types of radioactive waste produced in Ukraine. Based on this 
strategy, a national organization for radioactive waste management 
for long‑term storage and disposal was established in 2010. This 
state specialized enterprise “Centralized Radioactive Waste 
Management Enterprise” reports to the State Agency of Ukraine 
on Management of the Exclusion Zone (SAUMEZ).
Ukraine continues to deal with the consequences 
of the 1986 Chernobyl accident and radioactive waste generated 
by past practices. With help from the EU TACIS and INSC 
programmes, as well as the large financial support from 
the Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF) and Nuclear Safety Account 
(NSA), both of which are international donor funds managed 
by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), improvements have been made in the organisation 
of radioactive waste management.
Within the Exclusion Zone, the following key elements 
of the radioactive waste management infrastructure were 
developed:
• Industrial Complex for Solid Radioactive Waste 
Management (completed);
• Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment Plant (completed);
• New Safe Confinement (Fig. 4, completed in 2016);
• Centralized Long‑Term Storage Facility for Highly 
Radioactive Sources (completed);
• Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility (ongoing; expected 
completion 2017).
Fig. 3. View of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, the largest 
nuclear electricity generating centre in Europe
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The regulatory body of Ukraine, the State Nuclear 
Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) is support‑
ed by a capable Technical Support Organisation (the State 
Scientific and Technical Centre for Nuclear and Radiation 
Safety, SSTC NRS). Both organisations have benefitted from 
the cooperation with the EU through the TACIS and INSC 
programmes (Fig. 5). Note that the INSC‑II instrument shifted 
the focal point of the assistance to supporting national nuclear 
regulators and radioactive waste management activities; there‑
fore — since 2014 — the Ukrainian INSC support is primarily 
targeted at SNRIU and SSTC.
Helping the safe operation of 15 NPP units in the neighbour‑
hood of the EU, as well as handling the legacy of the Chernobyl 
disaster justified the high level of TACIS and INSC assistance 
provided to Ukraine in the past and continues to provide a ra‑
tionale for continued cooperation.
Recent INSC Projects with New Focus Areas
Management of Severe Accidents. Several safety upgrade 
projects are being implemented at Ukrainian NPPs to increase 
their severe accident management (SAM) and mitigation 
capabilities. In the frame of UK/TS/43 INSC project 
(Component C of U3.03/08 = Assessing the operating organization 
materials on severe accidents analysis and management) EU 
experts provided support and know‑how transfer to cover 
regulatory aspects of SAM. The joint work with SNRIU and 
SSTC included the reinforcement of the Ukrainian regulatory 
requirements (including incorporation of Fukushima lessons 
learned), and a joint review of the SAM guidelines. The relevant 
Ukrainian regulation was harmonised with the IAEA standards, 
the WENRA reference levels and the corresponding EC directives. 
In order to support the validation and verification (V&V) 
of the SAMG set, SSTC — among others — performed a series 
of MELCOR calculations [11]. SSTC also carried out ANSY 
CFX calculations to simulate the results of the VOLCANO VE‑
U7 (Fig. 6) corium spreading test experiment [12] performed 
at CEA (France).
Licensing of a New Neutron Source Facility. Currently 
Ukraine is constructing a novel Neutron Source Facility (NSF) 
at the premises of KIPT (Kharkiv Institute of Physics and 
Technology) in Kharkiv (Fig. 7). The project is carried out 
in co‑operation with the Argonne National Laboratory (USA). 
The NSF is based on the ADS (Accelerator Driven System) 
concept, where a subcritical assembly is driven by a linear 
Fig. 4. View of the Chernobyl safe confinement (“shelter”)  
during its construction
Fig. 5. Mobile radiation survey laboratory (RanidSONNI vehicle) 
delivered to Ukraine in the frame of an IAEA project, by Sweden 
and Finland + training was provided through an INSC project
Fig. 6. Simulation of the VULCANO VE‑U7 corium 
spreading experiment by SSTC, with the “real” experiment 
shown in the lower left corner of the picture (© SSTC)
Fig. 7. The building of the Neutron Source Facility 
under construction in Kharkiv (© SSTC)
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electron accelerator. The subcritical core is constructed from 
standard, low enriched research reactor fuel assemblies of type 
VVR‑M2, routinely applied in Russian‑designed research reac‑
tors. The basic aim of the project is to develop an intense and 
safe neutron source to be utilised in various neutron research 
areas, such as reactor physics, materials research, industrial and 
medical experiments, etc.
The licensing of such a facility is a challenging task for 
the Ukrainian nuclear regulator; therefore, project UK/TS/49 
(Comp. B of U3.01/12) provides assistance to SNRIU and SSTC 
during the licensing of the new NSF in the following areas:
• transfer of EU experience in the field of regulatory activi‑
ties for ADS facilities;
• development and improvement of the Ukrainian regula‑
tions for ADS;
• collaboration to develop models for supporting the safety 
assessment of NSF;
• development of a methodology for V&V of the developed 
models.
During the course of the project SSTC carried out several 
tasks related to the reactor‑physical and thermal‑hydraulic mod‑
elling and safety analysis of the SNF. Fig. 8 shows the model 
developed by SSTC to calculate the reactor core, while Fig. 9 
illustrates the result of a transient calculation.
Risk-informed Regulatory Decision Making. Following re‑
cent international regulation trends, SNRIU decided to include 
risk‑informed approaches into its activities, mainly in areas re‑
lated to NPP operation and maintenance. The associated INSC 
project UK/TS/42 (Comp. A of U3.03/08) provided assistance 
to SNRIU and SSTC in the following areas:
• development of the concept of an integrated regulatory 
oversight system;
• compilation of an adequate system of NPP safety indicators;
• development of procedures for risk‑informed planning 
of plant inspections;
• implementation of the integrated regulatory oversight 
system (IOS);
SSTC actively participated in all project activities and con‑
tributed to the successful completion of the project to a great 
extent. Among others, the project produced the document 
“Guideline for NPP Safety Oversight” and an inspection 
guide based on the results obtained by using the pilot version 
of the IOS. Fig. 10 shows the distribution of root causes of ab‑
normal events happened in Ukrainian NPPs between 2008 and 
2012, based on the [10] annual report. The decreasing tendency 
of events related to equipment failures is obvious, but the pic‑
ture also indicates that new, more sophisticated (e.g. risk‑in‑
formed) approaches are needed to further reduce the number 
of events in the other event categories.
Future Cooperation
The nature and scope of cooperation between the EU and 
SSTC has changed during the past 25 years to a great extent. 
After its establishment SSTC received EU assistance to build‑
up its organisation and its technical/scientific capacity, to be‑
come a capable and efficient TSO to SNRIU. In the early times 
the EU assistance focused on consultancy services, equip‑
ment (hardware) supply and provision of professional training 
to SSTC staff members. Later SSTC started to work in various 
INSC projects as local subcontractor, providing local expertise 
and technical support services. After 2010 SSTC was mature 
enough to participate in several INSC consortiums providing 
regulatory support as an equal consortium member, thus act‑
ing as a fully qualified player in the knowledge and know‑how 
transfer to third countries.
Meanwhile the international reputation of SNRIU and 
SSTC was steadily improving. In 2015 Ukraine (SNRIU) 
joined the WENRA as full member. In 2016 Ukraine joined 
the EURATOM Research and Training Programme, one year 
after joining the Horizon 2020 programme. SSTC also partic‑
ipates (as observer) in the European Clearinghouse, which is 
Fig. 8. Computer model of the subcritical 
assembly developed by SSTC (© SSTC)
Fig. 9. SSTC calculation to determine fuel temperature 
changes during a NSF transient (© SSTC)
Fig. 10. Distribution of root causes of abnormal 
events in Ukrainian NPPs [13]
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an organisation of EU nuclear regulators for NPP operating 
experience analysis and feedback, as well as in several EU‑wide 
research initiatives.
The EU–SSTC cooperation in the area of nuclear safety is 
bound to be continued in the future, because it is beneficial 
for both parties. Until 2020 the scope and financial resourc‑
es of INSC cooperation are defined in the INSC‑II instru‑
ment, but as relations between the EU and Ukraine continue 
to develop and evolve, new and innovative approaches, as well 
as additional R&D funds may play increasingly important role 
in the future. These additional channels are to be specified 
and detailed in the coming years, establishing further maturing 
of the EU‑SSTC cooperation in the near future.
***
The authors alone are responsible for the facts and opinions 
expressed in the article. The views contained herein do not 
necessarily reflect the official position of the European 
Commission.
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